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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RICHITA MARIE HACKFORD and 
ROSANNA FAYE HACKFORD VALDEZ, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CASE NO. 93-0400 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that the 
transfer made by the plaintiffs was not based on a fraudulent 
misrepresentation was erroneous. 
Because this appeal involves only challenges to the trial 
court's conclusions of law, the standard of review is one of 
correctness. GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
(Filed April 18f 1994) , and Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 
680 (Utah App. 1989) , aff'd. 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990). 
2. Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that there 
was valid consideration in the form of the Defendant bearing the 
expense of litigation to preserve and protect the properties and 
the satisfaction of a lien against the property was erroneous. 
Because this appeal involves only challenges to the trial 
court's conclusions of law, the standard of review is one of 
correctness. GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
(Filed April 18, 1994); and Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 
680 (Utah App. 1989), aff'd. 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling statutes in this action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title action concerning property in Uintah 
County, Utah. Appellants quit claimed their interest in the 
property to their brother in 1985 and sought to set aside those 
deeds by this action. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law entered on December 16, 1993 by the Eighth Judicial District 
Court for Uintah County, Hon. John R. Anderson presiding, 
dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint to quiet title in certain 
property. Notice of appeal was filed on July 6, 1993. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties in this matter are siblings who jointly owned 
property in Uintah County, Utah. Title to the property was derived 
from a final decree of distribution in the Estate of Richard N. 
Hackford, their father, entered November 9, 1982. (R. 136). The 
siblings commenced legal action against the parties' mother to 
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overturn various fraudulent deeds and clear title in the 
defendant's name and the name of his sisters. (R. at 137). 
The plaintiffs initially deeded their interest in the property 
to the defendant in 1979 at his request to facilitate the 
litigation against their mother, and because the plaintiffs had 
been advised and believed that if they owned property in Uintah 
County, their public assistance benefits would be reduced or 
modified substantially. (R. at 138). The plaintiffs again deeded 
their interest in the property to defendant in 1985, after the 
first litigation was complete. (R. at 138). 
The trial court ruled that the second transfer in 1985 was 
freely and voluntarily made. (R. at 138). The court stated that 
despite expressing some concern over the contents of the deeds in 
1985, and with knowledge of their meaning, plaintiffs freely and 
voluntarily signed the deeds in 1985 relinquishing their interest 
in the property. (R. at 138). 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint, 
stating there was no fraudulent misrepresentation and that the 
transfer of property was made for consideration, namely defendant's 
bearing the expense of litigation to preserve the property in both 
the probate action (Case No. 1452 and 2472) and the additional 
quiet title lawsuit Hackford v. Potter. Case no. 11,179; and for 
additional consideration of satisfaction of a lien against the 
property in order to have the estate free and clear for 
distribution. (R. at 139). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's conclusions of law are in error. The 1985 
deeds were signed only because of fraudulent misrepresentations 
made to plaintiffs by their brother. The court erroneously 
concluded that the plaintiffs received consideration for their 
interest in the property in two forms. First, because the 
defendant bore the expense of litigation to preserve the property. 
The expense of litigation was paid by royalties received by the 
defendant from the property which belonged to all of the parties. 
Secondly, the court held that additional valid consideration for 
the transfer was received by the plaintiffs through the 
satisfaction of a lien. This lien was a debt owed by defendant for 
his own obligation. The trial court failed to look to the intent 
of the parties and applied an incorrect legal standard in both 
instances in determining whether the plaintiffs' deeds should be 
set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
1985 TRANSFER OF THE DEEDS WAS NOT BASED ON A 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION MADE BY DEFENDANT. 
The property in this case has a convoluted history of 
transfers and litigation. The property was initially awarded to 
defendant, Richard Douglas Hackford, through a final decree in the 
probate case involving the parties' father, Case No. 1452 and 2472 
entered on November 9, 1982. (See trial court Exhibit 1). 
Plaintiffs agreed to transfer title to defendant in order to 
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facilitate legal action against their mother and half brother, Jack 
Potter, who had fraudulently acquired title to the parties' 
property; and because the plaintiffs believed that they would lose 
their public assistance benefits if they owned the property. (R. 
at 137). 
The court in the probate action subsequently entered another 
order, (trial court Exhibit 12 [Dated June 30, 1982]), stating that 
the plaintiffs had quit claimed their interest to defendant but 
reserving final decision as to title to the outcome of the 
companion case. The probate order numbered Exhibit 12 states at 
paragraph 8 "This settlement, however, shall have no affect on the 
litigation entitled Hackford vs. Potter. Civil No. 11179." 
The Hackford v. Potter action was a quiet title action 
initiated by all three parties here. That action resulted in the 
entry of an order, trial court Exhibit 6, wherein title was vested 
in plaintiffs and defendant. That order was entered on July 27, 
1983 and recorded with the Uintah County Recorder on April 5, 1985. 
After the recording, defendant requested that plaintiffs again 
sign quit claim deeds to him. This was done on the 11th day of 
April, 1985; and again on the 30th day of Pecember, 1985. (See 
trial court Exhibits 7 and 8). (There were two sets of quit claim 
deeds acquired from plaintiffs because of minor errors in the 
deeds). It is these 1985 conveyances on which the instant action 
is based. Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that the 1985 
deeds were procured by the defendant through fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
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In order for a party to show that a deed should be set aside 
for fraudulent misrepresentation, the party must prove each of nine 
elements set forth in Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah 
App. 1993): a representation was made regarding a presently 
existing material fact which was false, which representation either 
knew to be false, or made recklessly, knowing that he/she had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation, for 
the purpose of inducing other party to act upon it, and that the 
other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, did 
in fact rely upon it and was thereby induced to act to her injury 
and damage. See also, Wright v. Westside Nursery. 187 P.2d 508 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The Despain court held that "[a] person may rely upon positive 
assertions made by another, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 
(Utah 1980), and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured 
party to avoid the contract. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. 
Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801-04 (Utah 1980)." Despain v. Despain, 855 
P.2d at 257. The Despain court further required that the reliance 
be reasonable to be asserted as a claim of fraud. Id. 
Following the analysis set forth in Despain, plaintiffs deeded 
their interest in their property solely upon the assertions made by 
defendant, their brother, concerning their possible loss of the 
property and/or their welfare assistance. The defendant induced 
plaintiffs to deed their property interest based upon material 
facts that he either had insufficient knowledge to assert or 
knowingly knew were not true. (R. at 363 and 364). 
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Plaintiffs' reliance upon their brother's representation was 
reasonable when considering his reasoning for the deed and their 
familial relationship. Defendant stated to plaintiffs that they 
would lose their welfare assistance if the state found out that 
plaintiffs owned property, and that defendant needed the property 
title to advance the costs of litigation against their mother. 
Relying upon their brother's assertions, plaintiffs voluntarily 
deeded their property interest to defendant. This reliance was 
reasonable. The record shows the plaintiffs had transferred their 
interest to their brother on a temporary basis prior to the 1985 
deeds. (R. at 271 and 272). In 1979, the sisters transferred the 
property to defendant. (R. at 137). Defendant followed through 
with his promise to return the land. (See trial court Exhibit 6, 
signed and entered on the 27th day of July, 1983, recorded with the 
Uintah County Recorder on April 5, 1985). 
This Court held in a contracts fraud case that "a person will 
be given relief from fraud even though he failed to read the 
contract before signing if he was by some act or artifice induced 
to refrain from reading it, or if because of the circumstances he 
was justified in relying on the representations made . . . ." 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (1945). Simply 
stated, plaintiffs deeded their property interest based upon 
defendant's misleading representations. They were justified in 
relying on his statements because they had a relationship of trust. 
The sisters had previously relied on his word, and he had followed 
through with the promise of returning the property. 
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Plaintiffs had no reason to question the defendant's 
representations because plaintiffs presumed their brother would act 
in their mutual best interest regarding their property. The 
plaintiffs trusted the defendant. Plaintiff Hackford Valdez lived 
on the property and paid property taxes on the property, and 
believed herself to be the owner. Accordingly, plaintiffs deeded 
their interest solely for what they thought would be a temporary 
situation to handle the litigation against their mother. More 
importantly, neither plaintiff intended to relinquish their 
respective property interest. The court failed to look at the 
intent of the parties. 
The court erroneously concluded that no fraudulent 
misrepresentation occurred because there was valid consideration 
received by the plaintiffs. This was an incorrect conclusion. The 
court did not examine the nine elements required for the claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. This resulted in the application of 
an incorrect legal standard. In arriving at this conclusion, the 
court made several critical errors. 
In the findings of fact paragraph number 6, the court 
erroneously concludes that the prior litigation gave title to the 
defendant at its conclusion. This was wrong as evidenced by trial 
court Exhibit number 6. Title was vested in all of the parties in 
this action. More incorrect findings were made in paragraph 6 of 
the court's findings. (R. at 137). The court states that 
plaintiffs had been advised and believed (right or wrong), that if 
they owned property in Uintah County, the public assistance 
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benefits would be reduced or modified substantially as pertains to 
the 1979 deed. This was in essence correct, however, the court 
erroneously concluded that what was at issue in this action was the 
1979 transfer. Although the 1979 transfer of interest was 
important to show that the plaintiffs' reliance on the statements 
of the defendant were justified and reasonable, the issue of 
whether or not valid consideration was received for the 1979 
transfer is not determinative in this case. The plaintiffs 
transferred the property in 1979, based on the representation that 
the property would be given back to them after the litigation. The 
record supports the fact that in this first instance, the defendant 
kept his promise to return the property. The property was 
transferred to them after the probate and Hackford v. Potter 
litigations were resolved on April 5, 1985. (See trial court 
Exhibit 6, signed and entered on the 27th day of July, 1983, 
recorded with the Uintah County Recorder on April 5, 1985). 
The Court while admitting that the initial conveyance in 1979 
was made because the plaintiffs had been advised that they would 
lose their benefits, makes no findings as to the claim of 
plaintiffs that the defendant told them that they would lose their 
benefits and the property in the 1985 deeds. The same type of 
misrepresentation that was made to them in 1979 caused them to 
transfer their interest again in 1985. The record shows evidence 
that a number of representations were made by the defendant, and/or 
by defendant through attorneys, to the plaintiffs for the purpose 
of inducing them to sign the quit claim deeds in favor of the 
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defendant in 1985. (R. at 196, 225, 246, 274, 276). The court 
erroneously concluded that there was valid consideration for the 
transfer in 1979, and uses that consideration as a basis to hold 
that there were no fraudulent misrepresentations made by the 
defendant. 
Evidence was presented by plaintiffs and from two additional 
witnesses, Arilissa Pope (R. 246) and Lillian Rene Brewster (R. at 
259) supporting their contentions that they were induced to sign 
the deeds only by defendant's representations and assurances that 
the land would be deeded back to them at a later date. The 
plaintiffs testified that they questioned the signing of the deeds 
and that they would have continued to refuse to sign the deeds if 
they had not been assured that they were solely for the purpose of 
assuring that they did not lose the land. (R. at 272, 274, 275). 
It is clear from the record that the court erroneously 
concluded that the 1979 deeds were being questioned. This was 
wrong in that the Plaintiffs had already reacquired their interest 
in the land in 1985. Whether or not there was valid consideration 
for the 1979 deeds was not a sufficient legal basis to rule that 
there was no fraudulent misrepresentation as to the 1985 deeds. If 
the plaintiffs did not have an interest in the property in 1985, 
then there would have been no purpose or need for the defendant to 
acquire another quit claim deed from both plaintiffs in 1985. The 
court cannot use "valid consideration" for the 1979 transfer as a 
basis for holding that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation in 
1985. By concentrating on the 1979 deeds, the court failed to 
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apply the nine element test for fraud, and thus applied an 
incorrect legal standard. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDES THAT VALID CONSIDERATION 
WAS RECEIVED BY THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE FORM OF DEFENDANT'S 
PAYMENT OF PREVIOUS LITIGATION AND OF A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY 
The intent of the parties is relevant at this point. The 
trial court erroneously found that plaintiffs were given valid 
consideration for allowing defendant to bear the costs of 
litigation against their mother and for satisfaction of a lien 
against the property. Both of these findings are incorrect 
assertions of law because valid consideration was not given to 
plaintiffs. 
The court failed to look at the crucial issue of what the 
parties' intent was. Defendant had no intention of giving back the 
title to plaintiffs' share of the property. The plaintiffs had no 
intention of permanently giving up their property rights to 
defendant. Therefore, the parties' intent regarding the transfer 
of title is decisive in determining what formed the basis of 
plaintiffs' and defendant's agreement to deed the property to 
defendant. There was no meeting of the minds in this case. 
The trial court cursorily found that valid consideration was 
given to plaintiffs, stopping its analysis there. Had the trial 
court more properly examined the consideration issue, it could 
reasonably find that adequate consideration was not given in the 
first instance. The trial court's failure to critically analyze 
11 
the basis of the consideration allowed it to completely skirt the 
more relevant inquiry: the parties' intention in giving and 
receiving the deeds. 
Because of the temporary nature of the transfer, no 
consideration was given by defendant for plaintiffs' property 
interests. The trial court found that the plaintiffs allowed the 
defendant to bear the burden of expense of litigation to protect 
and preserve the properties and thereforef this was valid 
consideration. (R. at 139). In its findings, the court held that 
the defendant undertook to preserve the family estate by filing 
legal action to overturn various fraudulent deeds and claims. The 
court further held that the defendant was responsible for all legal 
fees and expenses in this action. (R. at 137). The court then 
concluded that because the defendant bore all these expenses, that 
was valid consideration for the 1985 deeds. 
However, the evidence at trial shows that the defendant 
received substantial income from royalties on the property in 
question. (R. at 343-345). In fact, the defendant received 
approximately $600.00 dollars per year since 1980 for the property 
(R. at 346). This would amount to nearly $7800.00 in funds from 
the property from 1980 to the time of trial in May of 1993. 
Defendant then testified he received even more in monthly fees at 
the beginning in 1980. (R. at 344-345). The court concluded that 
defendant carried the expense of all of the litigation to resolve 
the ownership of the property. (R. at 139). This was erroneous in 
that the royalties and income attributable to the property itself 
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would have amply covered any attorneys fees. The Plaintiffs never 
received any of the funds from the property, nor did they receive 
any payment for the purchase of the property from the defendant. 
(R. at 350). 
The court further concludes that during the course of the 
litigation from 1979 to 1985, the plaintiffs expressed little or no 
interest in maintaining or helping the defendant with the financial 
burden of litigating for the property. (R. at 138). This was 
erroneous in that the plaintiffs were indeed involved in 
litigation. They were listed as plaintiffs in the Hackford v. 
Potter litigation. (See trial court Exhibit #6). In fact the 
plaintiffs acquiesced in allowing their brother to head the 
litigation because he offered to. They were in a relationship of 
trustf and relied on him to protect their interest. Defendant 
himself testified that he felt the plaintiffs were incompetent to 
handle the property and that he thought his sisters would lose the 
property if they were given it. (R. at 341-342) He also testified 
that he never paid anything to the Plaintiffs for the land. (R. at 
350), and that the plaintiffs could not afford to help him with the 
attorney's fees. (R. at 323). 
The court concludes that the giving of the interest in the 
land to the plaintiff's brother was in and itself consideration. 
However, that would not inure to their benefit, since they would be 
left with no interest in the property and would basically be giving 
their interest away with no return. 
The court also erred in the second issue regarding 
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consideration. It concluded that further consideration was given 
to Plaintiffs by satisfaction of a lien against the property in 
order to have the estate make a free and clear distribution. This 
conclusion is erroneous. The $6000.00 dollar lien that was 
extinguished was not for the payment of any taxes or any debt due 
on the property in question in this action. It was instead for the 
payment of a $6000.00 loan taken out by defendant to purchase other 
property. (R. at 338). The lien against the property was incurred 
solely by the defendant for another mortgage to allow him to 
purchase additional property for himself. Therefore, it stretches 
the imagination to see how plaintiffs could receive any benefit by 
deeding their property interest to pay off defendant's personal 
debts. Obviously no valid consideration was given to plaintiffs 
because the lien rested exclusively on defendant. Additionally, if 
the estate was to make a distribution, and the plaintiffs had no 
interest, than it could hardly be said to benefit them if every 
other party in the probate case received a free and clear interest. 
The record shows that Defendant promised the plaintiff Rosanna 
Hackford Valdezf that he would return the property on several 
occasions, if she would "pay taxes on it, get off welfare, she was 
going to get a job, be self supporting, do all this and that". (R. 
at 335). He further stated that for the past eight years, Rosanna 
had paid the taxes on the property and had improved the property by 
putting up a garage. (R. at 337). 
The payment of the loan procured by defendant for his own 
benefit can hardly be said to benefit the plaintiffs, because they 
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received no personal gain from that loan. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs never received any consideration for the property. In 
fact the plaintiff Rosanna made significant tax payments and 
improvements on the property because she believed she was an owner 
of the property. If the defendant truly believed that the property 
was his, he would not be likely to keep promising to return the 
property. (R. at 335). 
The court based it's decision on the erroneous conclusion that 
the receipt of consideration eliminated the claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. There was no consideration received by the 
plaintiffs. They claimed that they were induced to give their 
interest in the property to the defendant, through his fraudulent 
misrepresentations. The court failed to look at the intent of the 
parties and failed to apply the legal standard applicable in a 
fraud action, resulting in the application of an incorrect legal 
standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's failure to apply the correct legal standard 
in the fraud action and the erroneous conclusion that the 
plaintiffs received valid consideration for their interest requires 
that the trial court's decision be reversed. 
DATED this day of June, 1994. 
SILVIA PENA CHACON 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Alan M. Williams (3478) 
Attorney for Defendant 
365 W. 50 N. ,' #WJ.O • 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-^713 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHITA 
ROSANNA 
VS 
RICHARD 
MARIE HACKFORD and 
FAYB HACKFORD VALDEZ, 
Plaintiffs, 
DOUGLAS HACKFORD, 
f 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS, OF LAW 
Case No. 910800168QT 
.This
 (matter came before the Court for trial on the 28th day 
of May, 1993. The plaintiffs were present and represented by their 
attorney, Randy S. Kester. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney, Alan M. Williams. The parties 
testified. Other witnesses testified as we'll. The Court received 
i 
argument. The Court, having reviewed the testimony and the 
t 
argument as well as the law, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This matter concerns parcels of property located in Uintah 
County,* State of Utah, described as follows: 
Surface Rights Only: 
Surface right to the fqllowing escribed 
property: Towriship One South, Range One East, 
Uintah Special Meridian, Section 1,4: North 
Half Southwest quarter containing 80 acres, 
more* or less . 
Grantee, however, shall quitclaim to Kenneth 
Ray Hackford the following described surface 
right: Township One South, Range One East, 
Uintah Special Meridian, Section 14: North 
OEC i (5 1993 
JL .. deputy 
Half South Half of the Northeast Quairtjer of 
the Southwest Quarter of -said Section 14. 
Together w.ith 10 shares of water and water 
riijhts to said property, and together with a 
right-of-way to hav^ access to the land. 
. » » 
Grantee shall, quitclaim to Jonathan Dewey 
Hackfordt the following described property: 
Township One South, Range One East, Uintah 
Special Meridian, Section* 14: The South Half 
of the South Half of the Northeast Quarter of 
the Southwest Quarter of said Section *14, 
together with 10 shares of water in the Uintah 
Ouray Irrigation Water system, and together 
with* a right-of-way to have access to the land 
and also share one-half of the expense of 
fencing 'the above described property, if 
necessary. 
Mineral Rights: 
An' undivided 46/80ths to the oil, gas and 
mineral rights contained in t(he following 
tdescribed property: Township One South, Rane 
One East, uintah Special Meridian, Section 14: 
North Half Southwest Quarter, containing 80 
acres, more or less. 
Thfe estate will quitclaim to Rich'ard D. 
Hackford the following described property 
together wit,h the mineral rights thereto if 
any: 
Township One South, Range One> East, Uintah 
Special Meridian, Section 15: North Half; 
Northeast Quarter Southeast Quarter. 
South Half of the South Half of the Southeast-
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, Section 15, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 East,- Uihtah Special 
Meridian; ten acres. 
Defendant currently has title to \.*he above-described property. 
3. The parties in this matter are siblings, all being 
children of Richard N. Hackford. 
3. Title to theiproperty derives from a final decree of 
distribution in the Estate of Richard N. Hackf6rd, Probate No. 2472 
under a decree of distribution signed and entered November 9, 1982. 
4. Richard N.Hackford, the predecessor in interest to this 
land died irt,1977. The defendant, Richard Douglas Hackford, was 
then serving on active duty with the United Statep Navy. Upon his 
return in late 19T7, it became apparent that his mother was 
attempting to 'spirit off some of the acreage by selling it to 
i 
various half brothers of the parties. The defendant undertook to 
preserve the family estate by filing legal action to overturn 
various fraudulent deeds and claims to made by the estate relating 
to the above-jiescribed property. The defendant was responsible for 
t 
all legal *fees and other expenses in the attempts to overturn all 
the transfers of apreage. 
5. From thet outset, the plaintiffs were asked to sign 
t 
conveyances jand deeds to the benefit of the defendant to allow him 
to pursue both the probate*and civil litigation against the Jack 
Dotter, the half-brother who had received one conveyance of land. 
6. The 1979 deeds were freely given and freely signed by the 
r 
plaintiffs for two purposes: 
(a) To all6w Richard Douglas Hackford to proceed to 
i 
preserve the estate and property at his cost, and 
(b) The plaintiffs had been advised' and believed 
! ' 
i 
(right or wrong), that if they owned property 
in Uintah County, the public assistance benefits 
would be reduced or' modified substantially. 
Both plaintiff at the time, in 1979, and throughout the course of 
this litigation received welfare and/or food stamps. 
7. Parties continued from 1979 for the next several years in 
i 
litigation with Mr. Hackford carrying the expense of the litigation 
to resolve thte ownership of the estate. 
8. The plaintiffs also freely and voluntarily signed deeds 
in 1985 giving* the defendant all rtheir rights in the subject 
properties• 
9. The litigation in both the Dotter case and the probate 
estate was resolved in favor of the parties thus giving title to 
the defendant,at the conclusion of the prior litigation. 
t 
10. In 1985, one plaintiff, Rosanna Faye Hackford Valdez, 
occupied one of thef subject properties by permission and with the 
consent of the defendant. Although she did not pay rent, she was 
required and, did pay property taxes as well as maintaining the 
property until the present date. Durihg the course of the 
litigation from 1979 to 1985, the plaintiffs expressed little or 
j 
no 'interest in maintaining or helping the defendant with the 
i 
financial burden of litigating the family interest and preserving 
the estate of the acreage. < The plaintiffs were more secure in 
their public assistance payments than in actively pursuing 
ownership of real property with its requirement' of capital outlay 
for its preservation*. 
11. Despite expressing some concern over the contents of the 
deeds in 1985, and with knowledge* of their meaning, plaintiffs 
freely and voluntarily signed deeds in 1985 relinquishing their 
interest in the subject properties. The Court finds that from the 
content of the description of the teal estate in the probate 
decree, the descriptions of the various Quit Claim Deeds and 
Warranty Deed^, and from the evidence that the pleadings should be 
conformed to be consistent so far as the acreage in Township 1 
South, Range 1 East, U.S.M., Sections 14 and 15, are concerned. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
r 
! 
1. Allydeeds to the defendant' from the plaintiffs were not 
f 
based on any fraudulent misrepresentations, and, in fact, the 
plaintiffs acquiesced in allowing the defendant to bear the burden 
of expense of litigation to protect and preserve the properties and 
i 
f 
therefore were given for valid consideration. 
2. There is evidence that further consideration was also 
f 
given to the defendant based on satisfaction of a lien against the 
property in order to have tke estate make a free and clear 
distribution. 
3. That the complaiht of the plaintiffs should be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
4. ^hat title to 110 acres more or less of the real estate 
previbusly described in this matter should be quieted in the name 
ok Richard Douglas Hackford. 
5. Defendant should be awarded costs. 
DATED* this day of_ P&*~ . 1993. 
Jf Jud^e 
annrcwnTTM 1 - 5 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed 
Finding^ of, Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed postage prepaid 
to Randy S. Kester, Attorriey at La,w, at 101 East 200 South, 
Springville, Utah, 84663 on this 6 day of fJdWuvk *-
1993, 
dh,,%i.Wi]Ic t-d-n-
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
BY:SILVIA PENA CHACON #5335 
BRUCE'M. PLENK #2613 
Attorneys for Appellants ' 
124 South 400 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9613 
IN
 VTHE EIGHTH JUDICIAL1 DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTA COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHITA MARIE HACKFORD 
and ROSANNA FAYE HACKFORD 
VALDEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CASE NO: 910800168 QT 
JUDGE: ANDERSON, John R. 
Notice is heireby given that Richita Marie Hackford and Rosanna 
F. Hackford Valdezf appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the Order 
rendered in this action in favor of the Defendant, Richard Douglas 
Hackford, in the Eighth Judicial District 'Court for Uinta County, 
Vernal Department by the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, District 
Court Judge, on Jilne 8, 1993. 
0^ DATED this day of July, 1993. 
SILVIA PENA CHACON 
Attorneys Appellants 
(ytfuitofVL.-
By: SILVIA7PENA CHACON 
py:BRUCE M. PLENK 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify1 that <1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
i 
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for 
Defendant, 365 West 50 North, #W10, Vernal, Utati 84078,'this 6th 
day of June,. 1993f postage prepaid, 
A /{Mi*s 
397 JUDICIAL CODE 78-2a-2 
(6) There is created the office of associnte chief jus-
tice. Trfe term of office of the associate chief justice is 
two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The 
associate chief justice shall he'elected by a majority 
vote of the members of the Supreme Court nnd shall 
be allocated duties a« the chief justice determines. If 
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate (responsibiIities 
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law. 
y>90 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. .Repealed . 1971, 1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1} The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction t?o 
answer questions of stat'q'law certified by a court of 
the United States.
 f 
(2) The Supreme Court has,onginal jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments , and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion. 
t(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) case.9 certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals*prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline, of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e^ ) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with: 
(i) the ' Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the' State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Boar'd of State Lands, and For-
estry; f 
, (iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mirfing; or 
t (v) the state engineer; « 
(D final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a s ta tute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; » 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
t a l felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does , 
not have original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of
 t the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital* felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections 
(3)(a) through (d). » 
(5) The Supreme Court has snle discietion in 
granting or denying a petition for
 fwnt of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeal*; adjudication, hut 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2-3. R e p e a l e d . , 'i9B6 
t 
78-2-4. S u p r e m e C o u r t — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s 
pro t e m p o r e , a n d p r a c t i c e of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall, adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the 'courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supremp Court upon a vote 
of two-tjui'ds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Excepbas otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution-, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law in Utah. f 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-fc. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as hecossary for the operation 
of the Supreme Coutt and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
pdwers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1986 
78-2-7. R e p e a l e d . 1986 
7R-2-7.5. Se rv ice of sheriff to cour t . 
The court may at any time requite the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d . 1986, 1988 
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